Abstract. In this paper, we present several new related-key impossible differential attacks on 7-and 8-round AES-192, following the work of Eli Biham and Orr Dunkelman et al. [1] . We choose another relation of the two related keys, start attacks from the very beginning(instead of the third round in [1]) so as to improve the data and time complexities of their attacks. Furthermore, we point out and correct an error in [1] when they attacked 8-round AES-192, then present our attacks. Finally, we give a new related-key differential attack on 7-round AES-192, which mainly uses a property of MixColumns operation of AES.
Introduction
AES [2] supports 128-bit block size with three different key lengths (128, 192 ,and 256 bits). Because of its importance, it's very necessary to constantly reevaluate the security of AES under various cryptanalytic techniques. In this paper, we study the security of 192-bit key version of AES(AES-192) against the relatedkey impossible differential attack.
Related-key attacks [3] allow an attacker to obtain plaintext-ciphertext pairs by using related(but unknown) keys. The attacker first searches for possible weaknesses of the encryption and key schedule algorithms, then choose appropriate relation between keys and make two encryptions using the related keys expecting to derive the unknown key information. Differential cryptanalysis [4] analyzes the evolvement of the difference between a pair of plaintexts in the following round outputs in an iterated cipher. Related-key differential attack [5] combines the above two cryptanalytic techniques together, it study the development of differences in two encryptions under two related keys. Furthermore, impossible differential attacks [6] use differentials that hold with probability 0(or non-existing differentials) to eliminate wrong key material and leave the right key candidate. And in this case, the combined attack is called related-key impossible differential attack.
There are several impossible differential attacks on AES [7, 8, 9] . The best impossible differential attack on AES-192 is on 7 rounds [9] .
If we view the expanded keys as a sequence of words, then the key schedule of AES-192 applies a non-linear transformation once every six words, whereas the key schedules of AES-128 and AES-256 apply non-linear transformations once every four words. This property brings better and longer related-key differentials of AES-192, so directly make AES-192 more susceptible to relatedkey attacks than AES-128 and AES-256. In the last few years, the security of AES-192 against related-key attacks has drawn much attention of cryptology researchers [1, 10, 11, 12] . In [10] , Jakimoski and Desmedt presented related-key impossible differential attacks on 7-and 8-round . Following the work of [10] , Biham and Dunkelman et al. [1] gave several new related-key impossible differential attacks also on 7-and 8-round AES-192, which substantially improved the data and time complexity of those in [10] . Both in [11] and [12] , the security of AES-192 against the related-key boomerang attack were studied. The best known related-key attack on AES-192 hitherto is due to Biham and Dunkelman et al. [12] , and it is applicable to a 9-round variant of AES-192. with is round 2 of the original AES". However, we can choose another key difference of the two related keys, and start the attacks from the very beginning, so greatly improve the data and time complexities of their attacks. Furthermore, we point out an error in [1] when they attacked 8-round AES-192, and then present our attacks. Lastly, we present a new related-key differential attack on 7-round AES-192, which can be regarded as a byproduct during the preparation of this paper, but it utilizes another property, ie., the specific property of Mixcolumns operation of AES. Amongst our results, we reduce the data complexity of our attack by a factor of 2 4 and time complexity by a factor of 2 14 for 7-round AES-192. The results are also improved in various degrees for several attacks on 8-round AES-192. Compared with the former attack on 7-round AES in this paper, the new relatedkey differential attack needs more time, but the data complexity is reduced. In all the attacks, only two related keys are used. We summarize our results along with some previously known results against AES-192 in Table 1 . Note that there is an error in [1] (which will be explained later), so the evaluated time complexities on 8 rounds are not right in [1] , we mark them with " * ".
Here is the outline of this paper. In Section 2, we give a brief description of AES. In Section 3, we choose another key difference of the two related keys, and present the corresponding subkeys difference of AES-192. Then a new 5.5-round related-key impossible differential is gained. Using this impossible differential, Section 4 presents an attack on 7-round AES-192; Section 5 firstly describe an error in [1] , then present three variants of our attacks on 8-round AES-192. Section 6 present a new related-key differential attack on 7-round AES-192. Finally, Section 7 summarizes this paper.
Description of AES
The AES algorithm encrypts or decrypts data blocks of 128 bits by using keys of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The 128-bit plaintexts and the intermediate state are treated as byte matrices of size 4×4. Each round is composed of four operations:
• SubBytes(SB): applyinging the S-box on each byte. The MixColumns operation is omitted in the last round, and an additional AddRoundKey operation is performed before the first round. We also assume that the Mixcolumns operation is omitted in the last round of the reduced-round variants.
The number of rounds is dependent on the key size, 10 rounds for 128-bit keys, 12 for 192-bit keys and 14 for 256-bit keys.
The key schedule of AES-192 takes the 192-bit secret key and expands it to thirteen 128-bit subkeys. The expanded key is a linear array of 4-byte words and is denoted by G [4 × 13] . Firstly, the 192-bit secret key is divided into 6 words [1] . . . G [5] . Then, perform the following:
is an array of predetermined constants, ≪ denotes rotation of a word to the left by 8 bits.
Notations
In the rest of this paper, we will use the following notations: x Let k i denote the subkey in the i'th round, and the initial whitening subkey is k 0 . In some cases, the order of the MixColumns and the AddRoundKey operation in the same round is changed, which is done by repalacing the subkey k i with an equivalent subkey w i , where 
and c are non-zero byte differences.
Throughout the attacks in this paper, we assume that the subkey differences are as presented in Table 2 . A 5.5-round related-key impossible differential can be built like in [1] . Firstly, a 4.5-round related-key differential with probability 1 in the forward direction, then a 1-round related-key differential with probability 1 in the reverse direction, where the intermediate differences contradict each other. The 5.5-round related-key impossible differential is: The second differential ends after the 6'th round with output difference ∆x ) 1 is a zero byte in the second differential, this is a contradiction. Using the above 5.5-round impossible differential, we can start our attacks from the very beginning. Hence, compared with the attacks in [1] , there is no unknown bytes in the key difference, whereas one unknown byte in the key difference in the attacks of [1] . Therefore, our attacks can proceed with one less byte guessing, which makes the time complexity reduced at least by a factor of 2 7 . Moreover, only two related keys are needed, which makes the data complexity reduced by a factor of 2 4 immediately.
A 7-Round Related-Key Impossible Differential attack
Using the above impossible differential, we can attack a 7-round variant of AES-192.
At first, we assume that the values of a, b, c are all known, ie., we have two related keys K 1 and K 2 with the required subkey differences listed in Table 2 . We will deal with the conditions on the related keys to achieve these subkey differences at the end of this section.
The attack procedure is quite similar to that in [1] . However, the attack complexity will be reduced significantly.
The Attack Procedure
Precomputation: For all the 2 64 possible pairs of values of the last two columns of (2) and (x 
Analysis of the attack complexity:
From the two pools of m plaintexts each, m 2 possible ciphertexts pairs (C 1 , C * 2 ) can be derived. After the filtering in step 4, there remains about 2 −24 m 2 pairs in each bin of the hash table. In Step 5, we have an additional 8-bit filtering for every possible value of (k 7 ) 3 separately, so about 2 −32 m 2 pairs will remain for a given subkey guess of (k 7 ) 3 . Each pair deletes one subkey candidate on average, and there are 2 64 subkey candidates in all, so the expected number of remaining subkeys is 2
, the expected number is about e −20 = 2 −28.85 , and we can expect that only the right subkey will remain. Hence, we get the value of 64 + 8 = 72 subkey bits. In order to derive m = 2 70 , we need m = 2 51 chosen plaintexts in each of the two pools. So the data complexity of the attack is 2 52 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is dominated by Step 5(e). In this step, m = 2 70 pairs are analyzed, leading to one memory access on average to H p and one memory access to A. This step is repeated 2 8 times (once for one guess of (k 7 ) 3 ). Therefore, the time complexity is 2 79 memory accesses, which is equivalent to about 2 73 encryptions. The precomputation requires about 2 62 encryptions and the required memory is about 2 69 bytes. In the above attack, we assumed that the values of a, b and c are known. Here,the value a can be chosen by the attacker. The value b is the result of application of SubBytes operation, so there are 127 possible values of b given the value of a. And the attack can proceed without knowing the value of c. Hence,we only need to repeat the attack for all the possible values of b. Therefore,the total time complexity is multiplied by 2 7 , the data and memory complexity remain unchanged.
To sum up, the total complexity of the above attack is as follows: The data complexity is 2 52 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is 2 80 encryptions, and the required memory is 2 69 bytes.
Three 8-Round Related-Key Impossible Differential attacks
In this section, we point out an error in [1] when they attacked 8-round AES-192. Then, present our own attacks.
An Error in the 8-round attacks of [1]
In Here, we will use x For the second and third version of the attacks on 8-round AES-192 in [1] , there exists similar errors. And we will adopt the same technique to reduce the amount of key bytes guess.
In the following, we will present our attacks on 8-round AES-192.
Our Attacks on 8-Round AES-192
In the following, we will give three variants of attacks on 8-round AES-192, which are all based on the 7-round attack in Section 4. As in [1] , the main difference between them is a data-time trade-off. In all the 8-round attacks, we guess part of the last round subkey k 8 , peel off the last round and apply the 7-round attack.
In order to reduce the amount of key material guess, we also change the order of the MixColumns and the AddRoundKey operations in the 7'th round, this is done by replacing the subkey k 7 with an equivalent subkey w 7 . And we use x W 7 to denote the intermediate value after the application of AddRoundKey operation with w 7 in the 7'th round.
If a pair of ciphertexts satisfy the condition that (∆x In order to satisfy the above conditions and guess less subkey material, we treat only ciphertext pairs that have certain properties. Take for example, to make (∆x W 7 ) 6 = (∆w 7 ) 6 , we only choose ciphertext pairs that satisfy (∆x O 7 ) Col(1) = (z 4 , 0, 0, 0), where z 4 is uniquely determined by (∆w 7 ) 6 to make the above condition hold, ie., M C −1 (z 4 , 0, 0, 0) = (?, ?, (∆w 7 ) 6 , ?). Similarly, we can decide the values of bytes z 8 (or z 11 ) and z 12 , which make (∆x W 7 ) 9 = (∆w 7 ) 9 and (∆x W 7 ) 12 = (∆w 7 ) 12 respectively. The attack can be performed in one out of three possible ways.
The First Attack Guess bytes 0,1,2,4,5,7,8,10,11,12,13,14, and 15 of k 8 , partially decrypt these bytes in the last round. These subkey bytes allow us to partially decrypt the last round in Columns 0,1 and 2. And we only treat ciphertext pairs that have zero difference in the remaining 3 bytes(before the key addition with k 8 , the same below). This condition allows us to use 2 −24 of the possible ciphertext pairs. Then the difference ∆x I 8 is known, we first check whether the difference in byte 12 equals to z 12 . This filtering is done using a 8-bit condition, which makes the remaining ciphertext pairs satisfy the condition that byte 12 in ∆x O 6 is zero. Next, applying the inverse of MixColumns operation to Column 1 and Column 2 of ∆x I 8 , calculate byte 6 and 9 of ∆x W 7 and check whether they are equal to (w 7 ) 6 and (w 7 ) 9 respectively. This filtering thus makes bytes 13 and 14 of ∆x O 6 equal to zero too, and uses a 16-bit condition. Then, guess byte 3 of w 7 and continue partial decryption to find out whether (∆x O 6 ) 15 = b holds, which is done using a 8-bit condition. After this filtering, the remaining ciphertext pairs can be used to discard wrong subkey guesses like in the 7-round attack.
In this variant of the attack, we guess a total of 112 subkey bits. And a portion of 2 −24−8−16−8 = 2 −56 of the pairs can be used in the attack to discard the wrong subkey guesses.
Here we can use the differential properties of the key schedule algorithm. 6 . This filtering uses a 8-bit condition, and makes the remaining pairs also satisfy that byte 14 of ∆x O 6 equals to zero. Then, guess byte 3 of w 7 and continue partial decryption to find out whether (∆x O 6 ) 15 = b holds. This is done using a 8-bit condition. After this filtering, the remaining ciphertext pairs can be used to discard wrong subkey guesses.
In this variant of the attack, we guess a total of 88 subkey bits. But only a portion of 2 −80 of the pairs can be used in the attack to discard wrong subkey guesses.
As in the first attack, the value of b and c can also be determined by a and subkey guess of k 8 .
Choose a pool of 2 64 plaintexts which differ only at the eight bytes 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13, and having all possible values in these bytes. Choose two such pools S 1 and S 2 , such that for each plaintext pair P 1 ∈ S 1 and P 2 ∈ S 2 , The attack procedure has many similarities to the above attacks, including the precomputation, the initial plaintexts selection and encryption, and the initialization of the list A. The difference only consists in the filtering condition of data. For each guess of the 10 key bytes, we will calculate the two values of (x pairs can be used to delete the wrong subkey guesses of k 0 . Each pair deletes one subkey candidate on average, so the probability that some wrong subkey guess remains is at most 2 64 ( To sum up, the total complexity of the above attack is as follows: The data complexity is 2 37 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is 2 145 encryptions, and the required memory is 2 69 bytes. Compared with the 7-round attack in Section 4, the data complexity is decreased, but time complexity is increased greatly. Nevertheless, the attack uses another different point of AES, ie., the specific property of the MixColumns operation.
Summary
Up to now, better results are achieved against reduced-round AES-192 using related-key cryptanalysis in contrast to other traditional cryptanalysis approaches. This fact reflects some weaknesses of the key schedule algorithm of In this paper, we improved the attack results presented in [1] through choosing a new difference of the related keys. Furthermore, we detected an error in [1] when they attacked 8-round AES-192, then presented our attacks. The new chosen related-key difference made our attack start from the very beginning of AES-192 instead of the third round as in [1] . Hence, the number of unknown bytes in the subkey differences become less, which makes the attack complexity improved in this paper. The comparison of our attack result and that in [1] can be found in Table 1 .
We also give a new related-key differential attack on 7-round AES-192, which mainly utilizes the property of MixColumns operation, but a pity that we can't extend the attack to 8-round at present, we wish that this point may be used in further attacks on AES.
